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We propose a theory of low-frequency movements in unemployment based on asymmetric real wage
rigidities. The theory generates two main predictions: long-run unemployment increases with (i) a
fall in long-run productivity growth and (ii) a rise in the variance of productivity growth. Evidence
based on U.S. time series and on an international panel strongly supports these predictions. The empirical
specifications featuring the variance of productivity growth can account for two U.S. episodes which
a linear model based only on long-run productivity growth cannot fully explain. These are the decline
in long-run unemployment over the 1980s and its rise during the late 2000s.
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This paper proposes a theory in which the low-frequency movements in unemployment are
explained by the low-frequency movements and the volatility of productivity growth.1 On
the one hand, an increase in long-run productivity growth lowers long-run unemployment.
On the other hand, a fall in the variance of productivity growth leads to a fall in long-run
unemployment even when long-run productivity growth remains ￿ at. The key mechanism
that explains these relationships rests on the assumption that real wages, or more broadly
real marginal costs, adjust more easily upward than downward.
A recent literature has highlighted the importance of real wage rigidities to explain
labor-market dynamics at business cycle frequencies. Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), Gertler
and Trigari (2009) and Blanchard and Gali (2010) show that real wage rigidities are im-
portant to account for a number of stylized facts including the high volatility of employ-
ment and vacancies as well as the low volatility of real wages.2 This paper complements
these studies by showing that real rigidities can also account for unemployment dynamics
at low frequencies and therefore it o⁄ers a rationale for the empirical relationship between
long-run unemployment, long-run productivity growth and its variance.
Our analysis is motivated by a number of empirical papers, including Bruno and Sachs
(1985), Phelps (1994), Blanchard et al. (1995), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Staiger,
Stock, and Watson (2001) and Pissarides and Vallanti (2007), which show time-series
and cross-country evidence in favor of a negative relationship between unemployment and
productivity growth at low frequencies. This literature is exempli￿ed by Figure 1 which
reports the trend in unemployment, the trend in productivity growth and the variance
of productivity growth for a postwar sample of U.S. data. The time series plotted in
the charts on the ￿rst row are obtained computing averages and variances over ￿ve-year
rolling windows. The charts on the second row display similar objects obtained using the
time-varying Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) model described in Section 3.
Two main features are evident. First, irrespective of the strategy used to look at the
data over the long-run, the charts on the ￿rst column of Figure 1 con￿rm the negative rela-
tionship between long-run unemployment and long-run productivity growth documented
in earlier contributions.3 Second, a probably less known, yet very interesting, feature of
the data is the strong positive association between long-run unemployment and the vari-
1The terms long-run, trend, mean and low-frequency are used interchangeably throughout the paper.
2Pissarides (2009) o⁄ers a critical appraisal of wage stickiness as a driver of the cyclical volatility of
unemployment in search models.
3Results similar to Figure 1 are obtained using ten-year rolling windows, the Hodrick-Prescott and
Christiano-Fitzgerald ￿lters.
1ance of productivity growth, which is uncovered in the charts on the second column. The
Great Moderation in the variance of productivity growth, for instance, coincides with a
sharp fall in the unemployment trend.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On the theoretical side, we develop a simple
model of the labor market based on the assumption of asymmetric real wage rigidities that
can account for the two empirical ￿ndings summarized in Figure 1.4 On the empirical side,
we evaluate formally the predictions of the model by exploiting low-frequency movements
in unemployment and productivity growth either over time or across countries.
In our model, wage setters face convex costs for adjusting real wages which can be
either symmetric or asymmetric up to a limiting point that nests complete downward
in￿ exibility. Asymmetric real-wage rigidities have two key implications. First, for a given
volatility of productivity growth, a slowdown in long-run productivity growth generates
a signi￿cant rise in long-run unemployment. This is the case because too high real wages
make it more likely that real revenues will fall relative to costs, thereby forcing ￿rms to
reduce labor demand in order to protect pro￿ts. With symmetric rigidities, this trade-o⁄
is weaker. Second, for a given long-run productivity growth, a higher volatility raises
the probability of an adverse shock and then leads to higher long-run unemployment.
Conversely, even when the trend in productivity growth is low, a decline in its volatility
reduces these risks and causes the unemployment trend to fall.
We present evidence consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. Time
series for the long-run mean and the variance of U.S. unemployment and productivity
growth are obtained using an estimated VAR with drifting coe¢ cients and stochastic
volatility Æ la Cogley and Sargent (2005), and Primiceri (2005). Panel regressions are
obtained using averages and variances over ten-year windows within a dataset of indus-
trialized and emerging economies.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the long-run mean and the
variance of productivity growth are signi￿cant determinants of the long-run mean of U.S.
unemployment. This is true even when we control for changes in the demographic com-
position of the labor force. Second, the empirical speci￿cations that include a measure
of productivity growth volatility (either linearly or non-linearly) are associated with a
signi￿cant improvement in the goodness of ￿t relative to a linear speci￿cation in long-
run productivity growth only. This is exempli￿ed by two episodes that cannot be fully
explained by movements of productivity growth at low frequencies: the fall in long-run
4The signi￿cance of downward real wage rigidity has been documented by a large number of empirical
studies on micro-data, which are di¢ cult to summarize in a few lines. Prominent examples include
Dickens et al. (2008), Du Caju et al. (2009), Fagan and Messina (2009), Holden and Wulfsberg (2009)
for the industrialized world and Calvo et al. (2006) for emerging markets.































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Long-run unemployment, long-run productivity growth and variance of pro-
ductivity growth for the U.S., computed using ￿ve-year rolling windows for the charts on
the ￿rst row and the time-varying VAR of section 3 for the charts on the second row.
3unemployment over the 1980s and its rise during the late 2000s. Third, the panel regres-
sions reveal that variation over time is more important than variation across countries for
the mean and variance of productivity growth to account for ￿ uctuations in the mean of
unemployment.
Few theoretical papers have studied the implications for the long-run relationship
between unemployment and productivity growth but, to the best of our knowledge, none
has emphasized the importance of time variation in macroeconomic volatility for the
unemployment trend. In traditional labor search models, the relationship between pro-
ductivity and unemployment is generally uncertain, as it depends mostly on the extent
to which jobs can be upgraded or need to be eliminated when new technology arises
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998). If ￿rms cannot embody the new technology into ex-
isting jobs, higher productivity would lead to job destruction and higher unemployment
(Aghion and Howitt, 1994). If productivity increases for all existing jobs, demand for
labor would increase and unemployment would decline (Pissarides, 2000, Pissarides and
Vallanti, 2007). In line with our assumption of real wage rigidities, Ball and Mankiw
(2002) suggest a possible rationale for a negative relationship between unemployment
and productivity ￿resting on the idea that ￿ wage aspirations￿adjust slowly to shifts in
productivity growth￿ , as ￿workers come to view the rate of real wage increase that they
receive as normal and fair and to expect it to continue￿ .
Our work complements an important literature which has built the case for demo-
graphic changes in labor force participation to explain low-frequency movements in un-
employment (see Shimer, 1998, and Francis and Ramey, 2009, among others). We show
that the ￿nding of a signi￿cant role for the trend and the variance of productivity growth
to account for the trend in unemployment is robust to controlling for movements in the
share of young workers in the labor force as well as to using the measure of ￿genuine￿
unemployment that Shimer (1998) argues to be una⁄ected by demographics in￿ uences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and shows the mechan-
ism through which asymmetric real wage rigidity generates a long-run relationship between
unemployment, productivity growth, and its volatility. Section 3 confronts the predictions
of the model to the time series properties of U.S. data while Section 4 provides evidence
for an international panel of developed and developing economies. Section 5 concludes.
The appendices provide details of the theoretical and empirical models.
42 The model
We describe a closed-economy model in which there is a continuum of in￿nitely lived
households and ￿rms (both in a [0,1] interval). Each household derives utility from the
consumption of a continuum of goods aggregated using a Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index,
and disutility from supplying one of the varieties of labor to ￿rms in a monopolistic-
competitive market. Each ￿rm hires all varieties of labor to produce one of the continuum
of consumption goods and operates in a monopolistic-competitive market. The economy
is subject to an aggregate productivity shock. This is denoted by At; whose logarithmic
at is distributed as a Brownian motion with drift g and variance ￿2
dat = gdt + ￿dBt (1)
where Bt denotes a standard Brownian motion with zero drift and unit variance.


















where the expectation operator Et0(￿) is de￿ned by the shock processes (1) and ￿ > 0
is the rate of time preference. Current utility depends on the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption













where ￿p > 0 is the elasticity of substitution among consumption goods and c
j
t(i) is house-
hold j￿ s consumption of the variety produced by ￿rm i. An appropriate consumption-









where pt(i) is the price of the single good i.
The utility ￿ ow is logarithmic in the consumption aggregate. In (2), labor disutility
is assumed to be isoelastic with respect to the labor supplied lt(j), with ￿ ￿ 0 measuring
the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.5 Household j￿ s intertemporal budget
5These preferences are consistent with a balanced-growth path as we assume a drift in technology.




















where Qt is the stochastic nominal discount factor in capital markets where claims to
monetary units are traded; Wt(j) is the nominal wage for labor of variety j; and ￿
j
t is the
pro￿t income of household j.
Starting with the consumption decisions, household j chooses goods demand, fc
j
t(i)g;
to maximize (2) under the intertemporal budget constraint (3), taking prices as given.













where the multiplier ￿ does not vary over time. The index j is omitted from the consump-
tion￿ s ￿rst-order conditions, because we are assuming perfect consumption risk-sharing
through a set of state-contingent claims to monetary units.
Before we turn to the labor supply decision, we analyze the ￿rms￿problem. We assume
that the labor used to produce each good i is a CES aggregate, L(i), of the continuum of









with an elasticity of substitution ￿w > 1. Here li;t(j) is the demand of ￿rm i for labor
of type j. Given that each di⁄erentiated type of labor is supplied in a monopolistic-
competitive market, the demand for labor of type j on the part of a wage-taking ￿rm of






























We assume a common linear technology for the production of all goods
yt(i) = AtLt(i)
￿; (9)
for a parameter ￿ with 0 < ￿ < 1 measuring decreasing return to scale. Pro￿ts of the
generic ￿rm i, ￿t(i), are given by
￿t(i) = pt(i)yt(i) ￿ WtLt(i):







where total output is equal in equilibrium to aggregate consumption (Yt = Ct). We
assume that ￿rms can freely adjust their prices. Standard optimality conditions under
monopolistic competition imply that all ￿rms set the same price given by







where ￿p ￿ ￿p=[(￿p ￿ 1)￿] > 1 denotes the mark-up of prices over marginal costs.6 An
implication of (10) is that labor income is a constant fraction of total income
PtYt = ￿pWtLt: (11)











6See the Appendix for the derivation of equation (10).
7depends negatively on the real wage and positively on productivity. Demand of labor is
critical to understand the main intuition behind our results. When productivity falls and
real wage remains too high, ￿rms have to cut on labor to protect their pro￿ts.
In what follows, we de￿ne wt(j) = Wt(j)=Pt as the real wage for worker of type j
and wt = Wt=Pt as the aggregate real wage.7 The choice of real wages is modelled in a
similar way to the monopoly-union model of Dunlop (1944). Given ￿rms￿demand (8), a
household of type j (or a union) chooses real wages in a monopolistic-competitive market
to maximize (2) under the intertemporal budget constraint (3) taking as given prices fQtg
and the other relevant aggregate variables. An equivalent formulation of this problem is

































Households would then supply as much labor as demanded by ￿rms in (8) at the chosen
real wages. In deriving ￿(￿) we have used (4), (8) and (11).
2.1 Flexible wages
We ￿rst analyze the case in which wages are set without any friction, so that they can
be moved freely. With ￿ exible wages, maximization of (13) corresponds to per-period
maximization and implies the following optimality condition
￿wj(wt(j);wt;At) = 0 (14)
where ￿wj(￿) is the derivative of ￿(￿) with respect to the ￿rst argument. Since equation
(14) holds for each j; there is a unique equilibrium where wt(j) = wt = w
f
t and in which
w
f
t denotes the equilibrium level of real wages under ￿ exible wages. Equation (14) de￿nes





7Notice that equation (11) holds because of the assumption of ￿ exible prices which is necessary for
analytical tractability.
8where the wage mark-up is de￿ned by ￿w ￿ ￿w=(￿w ￿ 1). Real wages are proportional to









2.2 De￿nition of unemployment rate
Following Gal￿ (2010), we de￿ne the unemployment rate as the di⁄erence between the
￿notional￿amount of labor that workers would be willing to supply in a competitive and
frictionless market at the current real wage and the amount of labor currently employed.
Given our preference speci￿cations, ￿notional￿labor supply, Ls
t, is de￿ned as the amount
of labor that equates the marginal rate of substitution between labor and (current) con-








Accordingly, the unemployment rate ut is given by ut = lnLs
t ￿ lnLt. Combining (16)






where uf denotes the unemployment rate in the ￿ exible-wage model given by uf = ln￿w=￿
and where the employment gap xt; equal to the output gap, is de￿ned as the log di⁄erence
between actual labor and the ￿ exible-wage level
xt = lnLt ￿ lnL
f
t : (18)
With ￿ exible wages, unions set too high real wages and at these real wages workers
would be willing to supply more labor than currently demanded by ￿rms. Unemployment
is given by uf and indeed captures the unions￿monopoly power. With real wage rigid-
ities, unemployment depends also on the output gap and can vary over time inversely
proportional to the variation of the output gap. This second component will be the most
relevant in our model to explain the dynamics of unemployment at low frequencies.
92.3 Sticky real wages
In this section, we investigate a general model in which real wages are allowed to adjust
either upward or downward but with some cost. In particular, we allow for both symmetric
and asymmetric adjustment costs through a linex function of the form
h(￿R;t(j)) =
e￿￿￿R;t(j) ￿ ￿￿￿R;t(j) ￿ 1
￿
2
for some parameters ￿, ￿; where we have de￿ned the rate of real wage changes as
￿R;t(j)dt ￿ dwt(j)=wt(j): In particular ￿ is a measure of the costs of adjustment, while ￿
measures the asymmetries in the cost function.8 When ￿ ! 0, we retrieve the standard





while when ￿ < 0 it is more costly to adjust real wages downward than upward and
viceversa for ￿ > 0. When ￿ goes to minus in￿nity, we nest the case in which real wages
are in￿ exible downward and fully ￿ exible upward. In the next section, we discuss this case
more extensively as it allows us to derive a closed form solution for the long-run mean of
unemployment.
In this setting, we assume that wage setters maximize (13) taking into account the
present discounted value of the costs of changing real wages9









The value function associated with the objective function (19) can be written as
￿V dt = max
￿R;t(j)
[￿(wt(j);wt;At) ￿ h(￿R;t(j))]dt + EtdVt (20)
where






and in which we have used the results that (dwt(j))2 = (dwt)2 = dwt(j)dAt = dwtdAt = 0
and de￿ned g0 ￿ g + (1=2)￿2.10
8Varian (1974) has ￿rst introduced this speci￿cation. Kim and Murcia (2009) have recently used it to
model asymmetric nominal wage rigidities.
9With similar tools, Abel and Eberly (1994) have analyzed costly investment decisions.
10The fact that dwt has the same properties of dwt(j) follows from the symmetry of the equilibrium.
10Using the expression for the value function given by (20) and (21), we obtain the
optimal value of ￿R;t(j) as implicitly de￿ned by the following condition











Using (20), (21) and (22), we show, in Appendix D, that the marginal costs of changing




































which is the continuos-time non-linear version of the Rotemberg￿ s (1982) cost of adjust-
ment model where the stickiness is applied to real wages rather than to nominal wages
and where we have de￿ned k ￿ (￿w ￿ 1)=(￿p￿2):






(at ￿ lnwt ￿ ln￿p); (26)








which can be used to derive the long-run distribution and in particular the long-run mean
11of the employment gap, x. To this end, we need to solve for the unknown functional





In particular, using Ito￿ s Lemma in equation (24) and the di⁄usion process (27), we obtain















Notice again that with quadratic adjustment costs ￿R(xt) = p(xt): We use (28) and
(29) to solve for the functional ￿R(xt) and p(xt) and then (27) to solve for the long-run
distribution of xt, if it exists.
2.3.1 The productivity growth-unemployment trade-o⁄
The di⁄erential equation (29) is solvable using approximation methods. In particular, an
educated guess would be to approximate the solution p(xt) with a ￿nite-order polyno-
mial.11 An interesting case, which can be helpful to discuss ￿rst, is that of a ￿rst-order
polynomial. Consider the symmetric quadratic adjustment cost model, with ￿ ! 0, and
consider small deviations of xt from zero. In particular, approximate the term e(1+￿)xt
in (29) as e(1+￿)xt ￿ 1 + (1 + ￿)xt: In this case, the solution for p(xt); which is equal to
￿R(xt), is linear and of the form p(xt) = ￿R(xt) = a0 + a1xt where a1 is the positive root








￿(1 ￿ ￿) + a1
g:
From the stochastic di⁄erential equation (27), it can be seen that the employment gap,
xt, follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process which in the long run converges to a normal
distribution with mean given by
E(x1) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + a1
g
11This is an educated guess since both the exponential in (29) and the logarithmic in (28) can be
represented with in￿nite-order polynomials, althought the latter only when jp(xt)j < 1.












Figure 2: Model with symmetric real-wage rigidities: long-run relationships between the
mean of unemployment, E(u1); and the mean of productivity growth, g; for di⁄erent
values of the standard deviation of productivity growth, ￿: All variables in % and at
annual rates.
where x1 denotes the long-run level of the employment gap. The above equation displays
a positive relationship between the employment gap and productivity growth and therefore
a negative linear relationship between unemployment and productivity growth




￿(1 ￿ ￿) + a1
g;
where we have used (17). Notice that at lower levels of real-wage stickiness (lower ￿)
the link between unemployment and productivity growth is weakened and unemployment
becomes close to the frictional level. Furthermore, in this linear solution, there is no
relationship between unemployment and the volatility of productivity growth.
In order to ￿nd a role for volatility, we need to take at least a second-order polynomial
approximation for p(xt) and ￿R(xt).12 However, as shown in Figure 2, when we assume
a symmetric adjustment-cost function, ￿ ! 0, we ￿nd that the trade-o⁄ between unem-
ployment and productivity growth is negligible and the curve is almost vertical. Moreover
12The approximations are accurate as long as xt, p(xt) and ￿R(xt) remain appropriately bounded
within the unit circle. In particular, a larger ￿ in absolute value requires stricter bounds for xt.
13the variance has a small role in accounting for signi￿cant shifts in such a trade-o⁄.13
A stronger trade-o⁄ and a more important role for volatility emerge when there are
asymmetries in real wage rigidities, as shown in Figure 3 where we let the parameter ￿
take negative values. As ￿ decreases the trade-o⁄ becomes more pronounced in a way
that it also depends on the level of productivity growth. Moreover, the lower ￿ the higher
the impact of volatility on unemployment. This channel is larger the closer the trend in
productivity growth is to zero.
When there are asymmetric rigidities on the downward side, lower levels of productiv-
ity growth are associated with higher unemployment because bad productivity shocks are
more likely to be absorbed by lower employment demand on the side of ￿rms, as in (12).
Firms cut on labor to protect their pro￿ts since real wages cannot fall much. At these
too high real wages workers would like to supply more labor than what ￿rms demand.
When the volatility of productivity growth is high, these bad draws on productivity are
even more likely requiring a larger adjustment on labor.
The mechanisms underlined by our model would be absent in a simple framework
of symmetric real wage rigidities unless there is a substantial and persistent misalign-
ment between real wages growth and productivity growth. Not only would a model
with symmetric real rigidities imply a weak relationship between productivity growth and
unemployment but also no role for the volatility of productivity growth in explaining
unemployment.
In the next section, we discuss more extensively the results in the limiting case of
complete downward real wage in￿ exibility.
2.4 Downward real wage rigidity
In this section, we assume that real wages are completely rigid on the downward side and
￿ exible on the upward side. This model can be solved in closed-form and its derivation
of its solution is helpful to illustrate the in￿ uence of volatility on unemployment.14 With
complete downward wage in￿ exibility, the wage setters maximize (13) under
dwt(j) ￿ 0; (30)
13In the Figure, we use the following calibration: ￿ = 2:5; ￿ = 0:04; ￿ = 0:66; ￿ = 6, ￿p = 1:15;
￿f = 0:05, ￿ = 1:77: In particular, within a Calvo model the assumption on ￿ would translate into an
average duration of contracts on real wages equal to one year and a half. Note that, as shown in Figure
1, the VAR estimates of the variance of productivity growth range between 0.0001 and 0.0005, implying
standard deviations in the range 1% to 2:3%.
14Benigno and Ricci (2010) study the implications of a model with downward nominal wage rigidities.












Figure 3: Model with asymmetric real-wage rigidities: long-run relationships between
the mean of unemployment, E(u1); and the mean of productivity growth, g; for di⁄er-
ent values of the standard deviation of productivity growth, ￿; and di⁄erent levels of
asymmetries, ￿: All variables in % and at annual rates.
15with wt0 > 0. In other words, agents choose a non-decreasing positive real wage path
to maximize (13): In appendix E, we show that this optimization problem leads to a
simple decision rule. Wage setters compare their past choice on real wages to a current
desired real wage. Whenever the past real wage is higher than the desired one, they are
constrained by the past decisions and cannot move their real wage. Otherwise, whenever
the current desired real wage is higher than the past real wage, they adjust upward to
that desired real wage, wd








































which is derived in Appendix E.
Agents￿optimizing behavior in the presence of exogenous downward real wage rigidities
implies an endogenous tendency for limiting the upward revisions in real wages. When
wages adjust upward, they adjust to the desired level wd
t; which is always below the
￿ exible-wage level by a factor c(￿). Indeed, optimizing wage setters choose an adjustment
rule that tries to minimize the ine¢ ciencies of downward real wage in￿ exibility. Wage
setters are worried to get locked with an excessively high real wage were future unfavorable
shocks require a real wage decline (as downward real wage rigidities would imply a fall
in employment). As a consequence, optimizing agents refrain from excessive real wage
increases when favorable shocks require upward adjustment, pushing current employment
above the ￿ exible-case level.
The above optimizing decision rule nests also a myopic rule in which agents do not
take into account the consequences of the current real wage choice for future decisions
and simply adjust real wages to a ￿ exible-wage level whenever this level is above their
previous choice. In this case wt = w
f
t , whenever dwt > 0: This myopic rule, which will
be of particular interest for the empirical section that follows, corresponds to the limiting












Figure 4: Model with downward real-wage rigidities: long-run relationships between the
mean of unemployment, E(u1); and the mean of productivity growth, g; for di⁄erent
values of the standard deviation of productivity growth, ￿: All variables in % at annual
rates.
case in which agents do not discount the future at all, i.e. when ￿ ! 1 implying c ! 1.
2.4.1 The productivity growth-unemployment trade-o⁄
We can now solve for the equilibriumlevel of employment and characterize the productivity-
unemployment trade-o⁄ in the presence of downward real wage rigidities. Since we have
shown that wt ￿ c(￿)1￿￿w
f
t ; equation (26) implies that ￿1 ￿ xt ￿ ￿lnc(￿): The ex-
istence of downward real wage rigidities endogenously adds an upward barrier on the
employment gap. Since at follows a Brownian motion with drift g and standard devi-
ation ￿; also xt is going to follow a Brownian motion with mean g=(1 ￿ ￿) and variance
(￿=(1￿￿))2 but with a regulating barrier at ￿lnc(￿). The probability distribution func-
tion for such process can be computed at each point in time.15 We are interested in
studying whether this probability distribution converges to an equilibrium distribution
15See Cox and Miller (1990, pp. 223-225) for a detailed derivation.
17when t ! 1, in order to characterize the long-run probability distribution for employ-
ment, and thus unemployment. Standard results assure that this is the case when the
drift of the Brownian motion of xt is positive, which requires g > 0. In this case, it can
be shown that the long-run cumulative distribution of xt, denoted with P(￿); is given by
P(x1 ￿ z) = e
2g
￿2 (1￿￿)(z+lnc)
for 0 ￿ z ￿ ￿lnc(￿) where x1 denotes the long-run equilibrium level of the employment
























In this model the average growth rate of real wages converges in the long run to
the productivity trend, g for any positive g:16 In the presence of downward real wage
rigidities, we ￿nd a strong negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the
rate of productivity growth, which is shifted by the volatility of productivity. The shift is
quantitatively important as shown in Figure 4. For given growth of productivity, a higher
volatility implies a higher unemployment rate. For given volatility, a lower productivity
growth implies a higher unemployment rate. Notice that under the myopic adjustment










as the function c(￿) in (34) is now equal to 1. Indeed, a value of c(￿) below one is capturing
the bene￿ts in terms of lower unemployment due to the intertemporal optimizing behavior
of wage setters who are taking into account the future consequences of their current real
wage choices and therefore set lower real wages when adjusting upward. Absent this
channel, unemployment would simply re￿ ect the structural level of unemployment, uf,
and the costs of the downward real wage rigidity constraint given by the ratio between
the variance and the mean of productivity growth. The relevance of this ratio to explain
long-run unemployment will be investigated in the empirical analysis below.
16This is an appealing feature of the limiting case in contrast with the model of symmetric rigidities.
183 Evidence for the United States
A key prediction of the theoretical model is that the variance of productivity growth
has explanatory power for the mean of the unemployment rate over and above the mean
of productivity growth. There are two ways we can take this prediction to the data.
First, focusing on a single country, we can construct time-varying measures of mean
and volatility, and then ask whether periods of higher variance in productivity growth
are associated with a higher mean of unemployment, for a given mean of productivity
growth. Second, we can investigate this relationship within a panel of countries. This
section describes the strategy and the results for the ￿rst avenue. Section 4 presents
evidence based on the second avenue.
As for exploiting the time variation within a single country, the U.S. Great Modera-
tion appears a natural candidate for assessing the empirical merits of our theory. During
the ￿rst half of the 1980s, the volatility of several measures of real activity, including
real GDP growth, residential investment and unemployment fell sharply in the U.S.. To
the extent that productivity growth also showed a pronounced decline in volatility, our
model predicts that this should have been accompanied by a pronounced fall in the mean
of unemployment. Figure 1 provides prima facie evidence in support of this prediction.
In this section, we ￿rst spell out the way the estimates in Figures 1 have been construc-
ted and we then use the time-varying measures of mean and volatility for productivity
growth to assess the ability of the model to account for the low-frequency variation in the
unemployment rate.
3.1 Measuring unemployment and productivity trends
The econometric literature o⁄ers several ways to model time-variation in the variance of
the stochastic disturbances as well as in the autoregressive coe¢ cients of stochastic pro-
cesses. Some of the best-known examples in macroeconomics include models of AutoRe-
gressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH), Regime-Switching volatility models (RS)
and Vector AutoRegressions with stochastic volatility (VAR). It is worth emphasizing that
our theoretical model has predictions for the rate of unemployment in the long-run. The
focus on the long-run makes the ARCH speci￿cation less attractive than the RS and the
VAR. Furthermore, the notion of real rigidities in the labor market hinges upon the pre-
sumption that changes in productivity di⁄use gradually, rather than abruptly, to the rest
of the economy, thereby making the RS model less attractive than the time-varying VAR
for our purposes.
Following the literature pioneered by Cogley and Sargent (2001 and 2005), and followed
19among others by Primiceri (2005) and Sargent and Surico (2011), we model the evolution
of productivity growth, gt, real wage growth, ￿wt, and the rate of unemployment, ut, using
a VAR with drifting coe¢ cients and stochastic volatility. The drifting coe¢ cients enable
us to construct a time-varying measure for the mean of the endogenous variables. Both
the drifting coe¢ cients and the stochastic volatility allow us to construct a time-varying
measure of volatility.
The statistical model is a VAR(p) of the following form:
Yt = B0;t + B1;tYt￿1 + ::: + Bp;tYt￿p + ￿t ￿ X
0
t￿t + ￿t (36)
where X
0
t collects the ￿rst p lags of Yt, ￿t is a matrix of time-varying parameters, ￿t
are reduced-form errors, Yt is de￿ned as Yt ￿ [gt, ￿wt;ut]0, and p is set equal to 2.
The parameters of the error covariance matrix, V ar(￿t) ￿ ￿t, are assumed to evolve as
geometric random walks while the parameters of the matrix of autoregressive coe¢ cients
are assumed to evolve as random walks.
The time-series for long-run unemployment and long-run productivity growth are com-
puted as local-to-date t approximations to the mean of the endogenous variables of the
VAR, evaluated at the posterior mean E(￿tjT). Let us rewrite equation (36) in companion
form:
zt = CtjT + DtjTzt￿1 + &t
where zt contains current and lagged values of Yt, CtjT is the vector of intercepts, DtjT is
the vector of stacked time-varying parameters and &t is a conformable vector containing
￿t and zeros. Following Cogley and Sargent (2005), the long-run mean for the vector zt





where, given the order of the variables in the VAR, the ￿rst and third elements of ~ zt
correspond to the mean of productivity growth, ~ gt, and the mean of unemployment, ~ ut,
at time t.
The time-series for the unconditional variance of the variables in the VAR can be
estimated using the integral of the spectral density over all frequencies,
R
$ ftjT(!), where
ftjT is de￿ned as:








The element (1;1) of the matrix ftjT(!) represents the unconditional variance of pro-
ductivity growth, ~ ￿2
t, at time t. Details of the model speci￿cation and estimation method
20are provided in Appendix B.
The data were collected in September 2010 from the Fred database available at the
Federal Reserve bank of St. Louis. Productivity is the non-farm business sector output
per hour of all persons (acronym ￿ OPHNFB￿ ), wage is the non-farm business sector real
compensation per hour (acronym ￿ COMPRNFB￿ ), and unemployment is the rate of civil-
ian unemployment for persons with 16 years of age or older (acronym ￿ UNRATE￿ ).17 All
variables are seasonally adjusted at the source. As we are not interested to explain quarter
on quarter changes, we compute annual growth rates for productivity and real wage to
smooth out the high frequency components in the data. Growth rates are approximated
by log di⁄erences. Results are robust to using quarterly changes. To calibrate the priors
for the VAR coe¢ cients, we use a training sample of thirteen years, from 1949Q1-1961Q4.
The results hereafter, then, refer to the period 1962Q1 to 2010Q2.
We can therefore compute the estimates of long run unemployment (~ ut), long run
productivity (~ gt), and the variance of productivity (~ ￿2
t) from the estimates of the VAR
(36) together with the formulas (37) and (38). These series are shown in Figure 1.
3.2 The ￿t of the linear model
This section assesses empirically the main predictions of the model: the mean of unem-
ployment depends negatively from the mean of productivity growth and positively from
the variance of productivity growth. More formally, we can write:
E[u1] = f(g;￿
2;#)
where the vector # ￿ (￿;￿;￿;￿, uf) contains the relevant parameters of the model and
f(￿) is a generic non-linear function which in the limiting case of downward real wage
in￿ exibility corresponds to (34).
A natural benchmark of comparison for this exercise is the linear speci￿cation em-
ployed in earlier contributions (see for instance Pissarides and Vallanti, 2007), which
relates long-run unemployment to long-run productivity growth:
~ ut = a ￿ b~ gt + "t (39)
17To make our empirical results comparable with earlier contributions (see for instance Staiger, Stock
and Watson, 2001), we measure productivity as the ratio of output to total hours in the non-farm business
sector, Y=L. This measure is computed and released by the Bureau of Labour Statistics. In our model,
productivity is de￿ned as Y=L￿ and the ￿rst di⁄erence of its logarithm is denoted by g. It should be
noted, however, that assuming a standard labour to capital ratio of 2=3 the correlation between g and
the ￿rst di⁄erence of the logarithm of Y=L is 0:91 over our sample period.
21where a and b are parameters and "t is a well-behaved stochastic disturbance. Using
the estimates of the VAR derived in the previous Section, we obtain the following OLS
estimates for equation (39):




￿ ~ gt + ^ "t (40)
where standard errors are reported in parentheses. The R2 of the regression is 0:77. The
estimates of this simple model show that there is a tight negative relationship between
productivity growth and unemployment in the long-run. In particular, a 1% fall in long-
run productivity growth corresponds to an increase in long-run unemployment of 2:24
percentage points. Alternatively, an increase of one standard deviation (0:002) in long-
run productivity growth would lower long-run unemployment by 0:47 percentage points.
Figure 5 confronts long-run unemployment, depicted as red continuous line, with the
￿tted values from equation (40), depicted as blue dotted line. The linear model does a
good job in tracking qualitatively the movements in the unemployment rate. However,
a closer inspection of the ￿gure reveals that neither the decline in trend unemployment
between 1984 and 1992 nor the rise since the late 1990s can be adequately explained by
the linear model, whose ￿t seems particularly inadequate to explain the developments in
long-run unemployment since 2007.
The theoretical model of section 2 suggests two departures from the linear speci￿cation
(39). First, it highlights the relevance of the variance of productivity growth. Consistent
with Figure 1, movements in the variance of productivity growth coincide with movements
in long-run unemployment, especially during the periods where the mean of productivity
growth was ￿ at. Second, under the limiting case of downward real wage in￿ exibility, the
model allows us to derive a nonlinear relationship between unemployment and productiv-
ity growth in closed form. To appreciate the relative importance of these modi￿cations,
we proceed in two steps. First we augment the linear speci￿cation in (39) with a vari-
ance term. Then, we estimate the relationship between unemployment and productivity
growth nonlinearly.
More speci￿cally, we estimate the following linear speci￿cation in both the mean and
the variance of productivity growth:








t + ^ "t (41)
The variance term is highly signi￿cant and the R2 is now 0:95, a signi￿cant increase
relative to the estimates in (40) which are based on a linear speci￿cation in long-run







Linear Model with Variance
Figure 5: Trend in the unemployment rate implied by the estimates of the time-varying
VAR (36) using formula (37), and ￿tted values of the Linear Model of equation (40) and
of the Linear Model with Variance of equation (41). Percent rates.
23productivity growth only.18 The improvement is evident from Figure 5. The ￿tted values
from equation (41) track unemployment trend far better than the linear model (40), and in
particular they allow the model to account fully for the decline in long-run unemployment
of the 1980 and the rise of the late 2000s. The coe¢ cient on the productivity mean is
somewhat lower than in the bivariate case.
The e⁄ect of the variance is also economically signi￿cant: an increase of one standard
deviation (0.00005) would imply a rise in long-run unemployment of about 0:25 percent.
The estimates in Figure 1 reveal that the variance of productivity growth declined from
0:0003 to about 0:0002 during the ￿rst half of the 1980s when long-run unemployment
fell from about 6:5% to 5:5%. Together with the estimates in (41), this implies that the
decline in the variance of productivity growth can account for about 50% of the fall in
long-run unemployment during this episode. Between 2000 and 2009, the variance of
productivity growth has increased from 0:00024 to 0:00038 against the backdrop of a rise
in long-run unemployment from 5% to 6%. These numbers imply a 70% contribution of
the variance of productivity growth to long-run unemployment during the 2000s.
3.3 Controlling for demographics
An important strand of the literature has convincingly argued that changes in the demo-
graphic composition of the labour force a⁄ects the low-frequency movements in unemploy-
ment (Shimer, 1998), the low-frequency movements in productivity (Francis and Ramey,
2009) and the variance of real output growth (Jaimovich and Siu, 2009).
In this section, we want to assess the extent to which the estimates of the linear models
above may vary once we control for demographics. To this end, we construct time series
for the share of workers in the labor force with age (i) between 16 and 21 (as in Francis
and Ramey, 2009), (ii) between 16 and 34 (as in Shimer, 1998), and (i) the sum of the
shares of workers in the 16-29 and the 60-64 windows of age (as in Jaimovich and Siu,
2009). Furthermore, we run a regression of the unemployment rate on a constant and the
unemployment rate of workers in prime age (de￿ned as those between 35 and 64 years),
and then use the ￿tted values from this regression in place of the unemployment rate in
the VAR to construct the trend of what Shimer (1998) refers to as a measure of genuine
unemployment which is not a⁄ected by demographics.19
The labor force series were collected in September 2010 from the Bureau of Labor
18Similar results are obtained using averages and variances of unemployment and productivity growth
computed over either ￿ve- or ten-year rolling windows.
19The estimates of this regression are: 0:0075 (.0014) for the intercept and 1:2716 (.0340) for the slope.
Standard errors in parenthesis. R2 = 0:851. Sample: 1948Q1:2010Q2.
24Statistics using data gathered in the Current Population Survey. These data can also be
used to compute the unemployment rate for prime-age workers. The series used in this
section are reported in Appendix A. The results of these sensitivity analyses are collected
in Table 1, which presents estimates for the linear model using the trend of productivity
growth and the measures of labor force share in columns (1) to (3), and then adding the
variance of productivity growth in columns (5) to (7). The estimates for the speci￿cations
using Shimer￿ s measure of genuine unemployment are displayed in columns (4) and (8),
without and with the variance of productivity growth respectively.
Two main results emerge from Table 1. First, controlling for demographics does not
overturn our ￿nding of a signi￿cant role for both the long-run mean and the variance of
productivity growth to explain low-frequency movements in unemployment. In particular,
the estimated coe¢ cient on ~ ￿2
t in columns (5) to (8) is never statistically di⁄erent from the
estimates in (41), which omits any demographic measures. Similar results are obtained
for the estimated coe¢ cient on ~ gt, although in column (4) this is statistically lower than
the estimates in (40). Second, in line with Shimer (1998), Francis and Ramey (2009) and
Jaimovich and Siu (2009), the composition of the labor force has a signi￿cant in￿ uence
on the low-frequency movements in unemployment, although its statistical and economic
signi￿cance appear muted once the variance of productivity growth is added as additional
regressor in the columns (5) to (7). The ￿nding of an important role for the variance
of productivity growth is robust to using Shimer￿ s measure of genuine unemployment
in column (8), although the coe¢ cient on the productivity growth trend is statistically
smaller than in (41).
In summary, we conclude that the long-run mean and the variance of productiv-
ity growth are signi￿cant determinants of U.S. long-run unemployment over and above






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































263.4 The ￿t of the nonlinear model
The results above point toward a signi￿cant role for asymmetries in real wage rigidities.
To investigate this channel further, we estimate the non-linear equation implied by the
model under the limiting case of complete downward real wage rigidities:












lnc(~ gt; ~ ￿
2
t;￿;￿;￿) + "t: (42)
Unfortunately, the parameters ￿ and ￿ are not separately identi￿ed. Nevertheless, we
can still estimate a reduced-form version of (42), which we refer to as the ￿ unrestricted
model￿ .
The estimates of the unrestricted model yield so high estimates for ￿ as to imply values
of the function c(￿) very close to one, which correspond to the case of myopic agents. We
therefore estimate also a simpli￿ed version of the theoretical model in (42) where we
impose c = 1 prior to estimation:











The simpli￿ed version (43), which is linear in the variance-to-mean ratio of productivity
growth, is referred to as the ￿ restricted model￿ .
The ￿tted values associated with the non-linear unrestricted model and with the
variance-to-mean restricted model are presented in Figure 6. Both speci￿cations track
long-run unemployment remarkably well and they clearly outperform the linear speci￿c-
ation of Figure 5 which is based on long-run productivity growth only. In particular, the
speci￿cations in (42) and (43) capture well the fall in long-run unemployment during the
1984-1992 period and its increase during the (late) 2000s.
The non-linear model has a R2 of 0:92 and a point estimate (standard error) for the
￿ exible-wage unemployment rate, ￿f, of 3:88% (0.29). The restriction implied by the
variance-to-mean ratio implies only a modest deterioration in the goodness of ￿t with a
R2 of 0:90 and a coe¢ cient ￿f of 3:41% (0.05). This suggests that the simpli￿ed expression
(43) provides a reasonable approximation to the unrestricted speci￿cation (42). Notice
again that in the simpli￿ed model (43) with myopic agents, downward real wage rigidities
play a crucial role through the in￿ uence of the variance-to-mean ratio of productivity
growth in a⁄ecting unemployment in the long-run.
In summary, versions of the theoretical model that feature strong asymmetries in real
rigidities appear to account for the low-frequency movements in the U.S. unemployment
rate which a model with symmetric real rigidity has hard time to explain. Similar results,
27available upon request, are obtained using Shimer￿ s measure of genuine unemployment,
which controls for demographic changes.
4 International evidence
In this section, we explore the empirical implications of the model in Section 2 within a
panel of international data. In particular, we are interested in whether the variance of
productivity growth has predictive power for the mean of unemployment across di⁄erent
countries over a su¢ ciently long period of time. Our international dataset is an unbalanced
panel of quarterly observations for developed and developing economies over the post-
WWII period.20
For each country i, we compute over a window of ten years: (i) the mean of unem-
ployment, ~ uit, (ii) the mean of productivity growth, ~ git, (iii) the variance of productivity
growth, ~ ￿2
it, and (iv) the ratio between the variance of productivity growth and the mean
of productivity growth, V -to-M ratioit:
Unemployment is taken from various data sources (World Development Indicators,
IFS, WEO, OECD, and Datastream, via splicing in the respective order); the sample
spans the years between 1960 and 2008. For productivity, we use real GDP per worker
where real GDP is taken from employment World Development Indicators, IFS, and WEO
(via splicing in the respective order) and employment is taken from the same sources as
unemployment. Prior to estimation, we drop observations for which there are less than
eight periods in a ten-year window.
The estimates are displayed in Table 2 and each column refers to a di⁄erent speci￿c-
ation and estimation method. The estimates in the ￿rst eight columns are based on the
Fixed-e⁄ect Estimator (FE) with time dummies included only in the columns (5) to (8).
The last two columns refer to the Between Estimator (BE) and will allow us to assess
the extent to which cross-country variation in the mean of unemployment is due to cross-
country variation in the mean and variance of productivity growth. In all speci￿cations,
standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In the FE columns, standard errors
are also adjusted for intra-group correlation.
In line with the theory, the coe¢ cient on average productivity growth is negative and
the coe¢ cient on the variance of productivity growth is positive. While the latter is
20The countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China,P.R.:Hong
Kong, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan Prov.of China, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Rep. Bol.








Figure 6: Trend in the unemployment rate implied by the estimates of the time-varying
VAR (36) using formula (37), and ￿tted values for the Non-linear Unrestricted model of
equation (42) and the Variance-to-Mean-Ratio model of equation (43). Percent rates.
29always signi￿cant, the former is signi￿cant only in the speci￿cations that do not include
time dummies. A possible interpretation of this result is that the countries in our panel
share a common trend in productivity growth which absorbs the negative correlation with
national unemployment. The coe¢ cients are somewhat lower than those estimated in the
previous section, in part re￿ ecting higher standard deviations for all variables in this
international sample. Indeed, the coe¢ cient in column 3 indicates that the e⁄ect of a
one standard deviation increase in productivity growth (about 0.02) is to lower average
unemployment by a full percentage point.
The signi￿cance of the variance of productivity growth is strongly supported. The
estimated coe¢ cient on the variance to mean ratio is positive and statistically di⁄erent
from zero in both speci￿cations (4) and (8), and therefore it accords with the prediction
of the model of section 2. As for the goodness of ￿t, the speci￿cations that contain the
variance term (either linearly or as a ratio) have the largest R2. The coe¢ cient reported
in column 3 suggests that the e⁄ect of a one standard deviation increase in the variance
of productivity growth (about 0.0005) is to lower average unemployment by more than
one percentage point.
While the between-country e⁄ects of average productivity growth on average unem-
ployment (columns 9 and 10) are not statistically di⁄erent from the within-country e⁄ects
(columns 1 to 8), the results of the last two columns reveal that the e⁄ects across countries
are imprecisely estimated. The FE speci￿cations are associated with a better ￿t than the
BE speci￿cations, thereby corroborating the view that the theory is more successful in
explaining ￿ uctuations in long-run unemployment over time. This ￿nding is not surpris-
ing as the cross-sectional dimension of the long-run unemployment rates is more likely to













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A simple model of the labor market with sticky real wages implies that unemployment
and productivity growth are negatively related in the long-run. When coupled with the
assumption of asymmetric wage rigidities, we show that the model generates a stronger
trade-o⁄ and the additional prediction that long-run unemployment depends positively
on the variance of productivity growth. We employ two alternative strategies to bring
these predictions to the data. The ￿rst, based on U.S. data, extracts the trend component
of unemployment and productivity growth and therefore exploits low-frequency variation
over time. The second strategy, based on a panel of international data, evaluates the
association between averages and variances of unemployment and productivity growth for
windows of ten years and therefore exploits low-frequency variation both over time and
across countries.
The empirical results show robust support for both predictions of the theoretical model:
higher volatility of productivity growth and lower levels of long-run productivity growth
are associated with higher levels of long-run unemployment. Moreover they are robust to
controlling for demographic factors, which have been recently shown to in￿ uence long-run
unemployment. The panel regressions reveal that variation over time is more important
than variation across countries to explain this pattern. Movements in the variance of pro-
ductivity growth, for instance, allows our model to account for two episodes in U.S. data
which cannot be fully accounted for by a linear speci￿cation in the trend of productivity
growth only. These are (i) the fall in long-run unemployment during the second half of
the 1980s and early 1990s; (ii) the rise in long-run unemployment during the late 2000s.
Our paper has also important policy implications. To the extent that stabilization
policies played a signi￿cant role in the Great Moderation, our theoretical and empirical
￿ndings highlight a new channel through which such policies may contribute to lower
long-run unemployment.
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35A The data



























Figure 7: Productivity growth, unemployment and real wage growth, quarterly data on
sample 1949Q1:2010Q2. All data are in percent. Productivity growth and real wage
growth at annual rates.









LABOR FORCE SHARE: AGE 16-21









LABOR FORCE SHARE: AGE 16-34







LABOR FORCE SHARE: AGE 16-29 and 60-64








UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: AGE 35-64
Figure 8: Labor force shares for workers with age between 16 and 21, between 16 and
34, between 16 and 29 plus between 60 and 64, unemployment rate for workers with age
between 35 and 64, quarterly data on sample 1949Q1:2010Q2. Percent rates.
37B A stochastic volatility model
The statistical model is a VAR(p) of the following form:
Yt = B0;t + B1;tYt￿1 + ::: + Bp;tYt￿p + ￿t ￿ X
0
t￿t + ￿t (B.1)
where X
0
t collects the ￿rst p lags of Yt, ￿t is a matrix of time-varying parameters, ￿t are
reduced-form errors, Yt is de￿ned as Yt ￿ [gt, ￿wt;ut]0, and p is set equal to 2. We stack
the time-varying VAR parameters in the vector ￿t, which is assumed to evolve as:
p(￿t j ￿t￿1, Q) = I(￿t) f(￿t j ￿t￿1, Q) (B.2)
where I(￿t) is an indicator function that takes a value of 0 when the roots of the associated
VAR polynomial are inside the unit circle and is equal to 1 otherwise. f(￿t j ￿t￿1, Q) is
given by
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t (B.3)
with ￿t ￿ N(0; Q). The VAR reduced-form innovations in (36) are postulated to be zero-
mean normally distributed, with time-varying covariance matrix ￿t which is factored as


























with the elements hi;t evolving as geometric random walks:
lnhi;t = lnhi;t￿1 + ￿i;t (B.6)
Following Primiceri (2005), we postulate:
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t (B.7)
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The model (B.1)-(B.8) is estimated using Bayesian methods (see Kim and Nelson
(2000)). Full descriptions of the algorithm, including the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) used to simulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the
states conditional on the data, are provided in a number of papers (see, for instance,
Cogley and Sargent, 2005, and Primiceri, 2005) and will not be repeated here.
Even though one cannot characterize analytically the joint posterior distribution of the
model parameters, it is possible to construct a Markov chain whose invariant distribution
is the posterior. The MCMC procedure draws from the marginal density of a set of
random variables j, conditional on some realizations for another set of random variables
i, and then drawing from the marginal distribution of i conditional on the realizations of j
in the previous step. Under some assumption, the chain converge to an invariant density
that equals the desired posterior density.
The elements of S are assumed to follow an inverse-Wishart distribution centered
at 2 ￿ 10￿3 times the prior mean(s) of the relevant element(s) of the vector ￿t with
the prior degrees of freedom equal to the minimum allowed The priors for all the other
hyperparameters are borrowed from Cogley and Sargent (2005). We use 100000 Gibbs
sampling replications, discard the ￿rst 80000 as burn-in.
39C Convergence
In ￿gure 9, we plot the posterior means of key model parameters. These statistics are
computed recursively as the average for every 20th draw of the retained repetitions of
the Gibbs sampler. The ￿gure reveals that the ￿ uctuations in the posterior means are








































































Figure 9: posterior means of key parameters of the time-varying VAR
40D The asymmetric real-wage rigidity model
The value function associated with the objective function (19) can be written
￿V dt = max
￿R;t(j)
[￿(wt(j);wt;At) ￿ h(￿R;t(j))]dt + EtdVt (D.9)
where






where we have used the results that (dwt(j))2 = (dwt)2 = dwt(j)dAt = dwtdAt = 0:21
From (D.9) and (D.10), the optimal value of ￿R;t(j) is implicitly de￿ned by the following
condition
Vwjwt(j) = h￿(￿R;t(j)) = ￿
e￿￿￿R;t(j) ￿ 1
￿
from which it follows that




Substituting (D.11) into (D.9), we get
￿V dt = [￿(wt(j);wt;At) ￿ ~ h(Vwj ￿ wt(j))]dt + (D.12)






where we have de￿ned ~ h(￿) = h(f(￿)) and g0 = g +1=2￿2: Taking the derivative of (D.12)
with respect to wt(j) we obtain
￿Vwjdt = [￿wj(wt(j);wt;At) ￿ h￿(￿R;t(j))f1(￿)(Vwjwjwt(j) + Vwj)dt + (D.13)








where f1(￿) is the derivative of f(￿) with respect to its argument.
First note that
dh￿(￿R;t(j)) = dVwj ￿ wt(j) + Vwj ￿ dwt(j)
21The fact that dwt has the same properties of dwt(j) will follow from the symmetry of the equilibrium.
41and therefore
Etdh￿(￿R;t(j)) = EtdVwj ￿ wt(j) + Vwj ￿ Etdwt(j)







Substituting into (D.13) we obtain
￿h￿(￿R;t(j))dt = wt(j)[￿wj(wt(j);wt;At)]dt + Etdh￿(￿R;t(j)):
which in a symmetric equilibrium implies






















































which are equations (24) and (25) in the text.
E The downward real-wage rigidity model
Let W the space of non-decreasing non-negative stochastic processes fwt(j)}. This is
the space of processes that satisfy the constraint (30). First we show that the objective
function is concave over a convex set. To show that the set is convex, note that if x 2 W







and ￿(￿) is concave in the ￿rst-argument, the objective function is concave in fwt(j)g
since it is the integral of concave functions.
Let fw￿
t(j)} be a process belonging to W that maximizes (13) and V (￿) the associated
value function de￿ned by









We now characterize the properties of the optimal process fw￿
t(j)g: The Bellman equation
for the wage-setter problem can be written as
￿V (wt(j);wt;At)dt = max
dwt(j)
￿(wt(j);wt;At)dt + EtfdV (wt(j);wt;At)g (E.14)
subject to
dwt(j) ￿ 0 (E.15)
From Ito￿ s Lemma we obtain that




















since dwt(j); and therefore also dwt, have ￿nite variation implying (dwt(j))2 = dwt(j)dwt =
dwt(j)dAt = (dwt)2 = dwtdAt = 0. We have de￿ned g0 ￿ g + 1
2￿2. Substituting (E.16)
into (E.14) and maximizing over dwt(j) we obtain the complementary slackness condition:
Vwj(wt(j);wt;At) ￿ 0
for each t and
Vwj(wt(j);wt;At) = 0
43for each t when dwt(j) > 0. We can write (E.14) as









which can be di⁄erentiated with respect to wt(j) to obtain









Since the objective is concave and the set of constraints is convex, the optimal choice for
wt(j) is unique. It follows that wt(j) = wt for each j: Moreover, super-contact conditions




It follows that we can write (E.17) as








where we have de￿ned v(wt;At) ￿ Vwj(wt;wt;At)



















with kw ￿ 1 ￿ ￿w: In particular we can de￿ne the function w(At) such that
v(w(At);At) = 0 (E.19)
vw(w(At);At) = 0; (E.20)
va(w(At);At) = 0; (E.21)
when dwt > 0 while v(wt;At) ￿ 0 when dwt = 0. We now solve for the functions w(At)
and v(wt;At): Thus we seek for functions w(At) and v(wt;At) that satis￿es (E.18) and























v ￿ ￿ ￿ g

































Since when wt ! 1 and/or At ! 0, the length of time until the next wage adjustment









which both require that ￿ should be positive. The general solution is then given by the




















































































































































Note that this is a set of three equations, two of which are independent.22 They
















































which shows that 0 < c(g;￿2;￿;￿;￿) ￿ 1.
22In fact, the homogenous function has been chosen appropriately for this purpose.
46F Derivation of equation (10)
A generic ￿rm i maximizes pro￿ts given by








and the production technology
yt(i) = AtLt(i)
￿: (F.31)
Using constraints (F.30) and (F.31) into (F.29) we write













we can write the ￿rst-order condition of pro￿ts with respect to prices pt(i) as
@￿t(i)
@pt(i)















It follows that at optimum
pt(i)yt(i) = ￿pWtLt(i)
where ￿p ￿ ￿p=[(￿p ￿ 1)￿] > 1: Notice that there exists a unique equilibrium for the
optimal price pt(i); given Wt; Pt and Yt. Therefore the equilibrium is symmetric and
pt(i) = Pt; yt(i) = Yt and Lt(i) = Lt for each i: Equation (10) follows.
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